Universalizability and Hoppe’s AE
Richard Opheim
August 26, 2022
Abstract
A rule or general principle of ethics that has to apply to all human beings is “universalizable.” Can such a rule be demonstrably true? Or is it at best only a nice hypothetical conjecture?
Kant
In modern philosophy, the idea first surfaces in the writings of Immanuel Kant in the form of what he called “categorical imperatives”—moral rules that help human beings to decide what ends they should choose. He formulated his first rule as:
“I am never to act otherwise than so that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.”(1)
Basically, Kant’s reasoning boiled down to the definition of “law.” In order to be a law, a rule had to apply universally. Moral law was universalizable because it was a law. This is, of course, circular, and constitutes “proof by definition.”(2)
From Kant’s time on, the attitudes of moral philosophers fall into three categories:
1. Those who assumed universalizability without further proof.
2. Those who questioned why moral rules should be universal.
3. Those who attempted (unsuccessfully) to demonstrate that moral rules are universalizable.(3)
Rothbard
Rothbard’s “ethics” are political; i.e., the ethics of interactions between human beings (“justice theory”). Within this restricted meaning of “ethics,” he attempted to show that the idea of universalizability is inherent in the idea of (interpersonal) ethics:
“. . . if we are trying to set up an ethic for man (in our case, the subset of ethics dealing with violence), then to be a valid ethic, the theory must hold true for all men, whatever their location in time or place.”(4)
Since “ethics” is defined as rules for all men, particularistic(5) rules are by definition not ethical. But this argument by definition still has to answer the question: Why can’t moral rules be particularistic?
Hoppe
Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics (AE)(6) was, in brief, as follows:
1. The answer to the question of what constitutes apodictically true rules of justice must be arrived at via the means of argumentation.
2. The act of argumentation presupposes that arguers have access to scarce resources. This has implications first of all for self-ownership: “. . . no one could possibly propose anything, and no one could become convinced of any proposition by argumentative means, if a person’s right to make exclusive use of his physical body were not already presupposed.”
3. Argumentation also implies the right to claim unused scarce resources via first use (homesteading), since lack of the latter would make argumentation impossible. “By virtue of the fact of being alive, property rights to other things must be presupposed to be valid. No one who is alive could argue otherwise.”
4. “. . . [I]f a person did not acquire the right of exclusive control over . . . goods by homesteading, by establishing some objective link between a particular person and a particular resource before anyone else had done so, but instead late-comers were assumed to have ownership claims to things, then literally no one would be allowed to do anything with anything unless he had the prior consent of all late-comers.”
The above are sometimes referred to as the presuppositions of argumentation (PoA).
Criticisms of Hoppe’s AE Related to the Topic of Universalizability
1. Osterfeld
“[T]here is the possibility of intermediate communities. Isn’t it possible for members of community A to agree on their own set of rules regarding property, for members of community B to establish their own set of rules, etc.? And then isn’t it possible for representatives of communities A, B . . . N to agree, bilaterally or collectively, on the principles governing interactions between their communities?”(7)
It certainly is possible for different communities to have different rules of justice, and that is the actual state of the world we live in. However, Hoppe’s AE shows that particularistic rules are not logically justifiable and are therefore arbitrary.
2. Ethan Waters
“The task of those seeking to establish the libertarian ethic is not simply to show that people possess rights that must be respected at some times and in some ways, but to show that the rights must be respected universally, in all contexts and in all ways. Hoppe fails at this task, as others have failed before him.”(8)
Hoppe answered this objection in an expanded version of his argument as follows:
“. . . as argumentation implies that everyone must in principle be able to be convinced of it simply because of its argumentative force [correctness], the universalization principle of ethics can now be understood and explained as grounded in the wider ’a priori of communication and argumentation.’”(9)
3. Murphy and Callahan
"To simply declare that ownership rights must be ’universalizable’ is no help, either; after all, communists could cite the same principle to ’prove’ that everyone should have equal shares to all property."(10)
This criticism ignored #4 above in the PoA. Also, Kinsella responded as follows;
“[Callahan and Murphy] write here as if they are totally unaware that Hoppe has explicitly stated that ’the universalization principle only provides a purely formal criterion for morality’ . . . Of course, even if socialism’s principles were reformulated in a completely universalizable way, it will still be inconsistent with other norms presupposed in argumentation. . . ”(11)
MC:
“. . . Hoppe has only proven self-ownership for the individuals in the debate. This is because, even on Hoppe’s own grounds, someone denying the libertarian ethic would only be engaging in contradiction if he tried to justify his preferred doctrine to its ’victims.’ For example, so long as Aristotle only argued with other Greeks about the inferiority of barbarians and their natural status as slaves, then he would not be engaging in a performative contradiction. . . . It is tempting to respond to the above example by saying, ’That’s silly. If Aristotle tried to justify his views to a barbarian debating opponent, he would necessarily be engaging in contradiction. Therefore, his views are . . . unjustifiable.’ [I]f we accept [this response], then we must also admit that human ’domination’ of ’lower’ animals is also unjustifiable.”(12)
To which Walter Block replied:
“The argument from argument only applies to people who argue, and chickens, horses, babies and comatose people simply are not in it. As for non-Greeks (barbarians) they are certainly capable of arguing. If they do, they would commit a performative contradiction if they initiated violence against a Greek."(13)
4. Timothy Terrell:
“[D]efense of the self-ownership axiom relies upon the rule of ethics that an ethical system must apply equally to all people. If this rule did not hold true, a special entity or class of entities could own one or more people. No reason why this rule of ethics must hold true is presented—it is accepted on faith and is therefore subject to the criticism above. It is no defense to place the burden of proving the existence of owned people on the opposition, for neither Hoppe nor Rothbard present any compelling reason to believe that this universality rule should hold over any other ethical rule. No justification is offered other than the ’self-evident’ nature of these principles. To argue the universality rule based on a ’most people agree that. . . ’ argument seems to ignore grave epistemological difficulties.”(14)
By this time, Hoppe had long ago expounded the proposition that arguing implies universal acceptance of the results of argumentation,(15) but see also below.
Conclusion
Hoppe’s critics in general preferred to attack AE on grounds other than lack of universalizability. I suspect the reason to be that many of them may have understood that the argument based on argumentation has built-in universalizability:
Major premise: Logically justifiable rules of justice must be presented via an argument (self-evidently true).
Minor premise: No one can argue logically against the presuppositions of argumentation (true, because attempting to do so would result in a performative contradiction).
Conclusion: Rules of justice not based on the presuppositions of argumentation can’t be logically justified (follows apodictically).
As an apodictic conclusion must be universally applicable, and only rules of justice based on the PoA can be logically justified, one can say that they are “universalizable,” i.e., must apply to everyone that argues.(16)
Furthermore, since no explicit reference to universalizability is necessary in the AE argument, one might also say that AE makes the topic of universalizability (at least, within the realm of justice theory) obsolete.
Notes
1. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, 402. A resemblance to the Christian Golden Rule, “And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise” (Luke 6:31), is frequently noted.
2. Kant’s Categorical Imperative makes a pretty good Hypothetical Imperative (a social rule that is attractive because of the ends that it seeks to attain, i.e. consequentialism), but Hypothetical Imperatives are not apodictic.
3.Hume's Law (explained elsewhere) states that such an attempt must be unsuccessful.
4. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, 42. This claim seems to owe something to Hare, The Language of Morals, 162.
5. A term coined by Hare (Freedom and Reason, 18), meaning the opposite of universalizable.
6. First appeared in “The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic,” Liberty (September, 1988), but was subsequently elaborated.
7. Austrian Economics Newsletter, Vol. 9, No. 3, 9–10.
8. “Beyond Is and Nought,” Liberty, Vol. 2, No. 2, 47.
9. Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, 131.
10. “Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethic: A Critique,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 53–64.
11. Kinsella was referring to what Hoppe had written in A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 157ff in which he expanded on the topic of the relation of the criterion of universalizability to other ethical requirements (“. . . the universalization principle only provides a purely formal criterion for morality.”).
12. Hoppe, ibid.
13. “Rejoinder to Murphy and Callahan on Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 22, 631–9.
14. “The Origin of Property Rights: A Critique of Rothbard and Hoppe on Natural Rights,” (2000).
15. Hoppe, op.cit, 131.
16. The topic of universalizability arises from a desire to circumvent Hume’s Law which will be dealt with elsewhere.
[1] Block, Walter, “Rejoinder to Murphy and Callahan on Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 22.
[2] Callahan, Gene and Murphy, Robert, “Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethic: A Critique,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2.:
[3] Hare, R.M., The Language of Morals, Oxford University Press, 1952.
[4] _________, Freedom and Reason, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963.
[5] Hoppe, Hans-Hermann, “The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic,” Liberty (September, 1988)
[6] _________________, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, Kluwer, Boston, 1988.
[7] Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, London: Longman, Green & Co., 1895.
[8] Osterfeld, David, Austrian Economics Newsletter, Vol. 9, No. 3.
[9] Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, New York University Press, 2002.
[10] Terrell, Timothy, “The Origin of Property Rights: A Critique of Rothbard and Hoppe on Natural Rights,” (2000).
[11] Waters, Ethan, “Beyond Is and Nought,” Liberty, Vol. 2, No. 2.
