Universalizability and Hoppe's AE

 Universalizability and Hoppe’s AE

Richard Opheim

August 26, 2022

Abstract

A rule or general principle of ethics that has to apply to all human beings is “universalizable.” Can such a rule be demonstrably true? Or is it at best only a nice hypothetical conjecture?

Kant

In modern philosophy, the idea first surfaces in the writings of Immanuel Kant in the form of what he called “categorical imperatives”—moral rules that help human beings to decide what ends they should choose. He formulated his first rule as:

“I am never to act otherwise than so that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.”(1)

Basically, Kant’s reasoning boiled down to the definition of “law.” In order to be a law, a rule had to apply universally. Moral law was universalizable because it was a law. This is, of course, circular, and constitutes “proof by definition.”(2)

From Kant’s time on, the attitudes of moral philosophers fall into three categories:

1. Those who assumed universalizability without further proof.

2. Those who questioned why moral rules should be universal.

3. Those who attempted (unsuccessfully) to demonstrate that moral rules are universalizable.(3) 

Rothbard

Rothbard’s “ethics” are political; i.e., the ethics of interactions between human beings (“justice theory”). Within this restricted meaning of “ethics,” he attempted to show that the idea of universalizability is inherent in the idea of (interpersonal) ethics:

“. . . if we are trying to set up an ethic for man (in our case, the subset of ethics dealing with violence), then to be a valid ethic, the theory must hold true for all men, whatever their location in time or place.”(4)

Since “ethics” is defined as rules for all men, particularistic(5) rules are by definition not ethical. But this argument by definition still has to answer the question: Why can’t moral rules be particularistic?

Hoppe

Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics (AE)(6) was, in brief, as follows:

1. The answer to the question of what constitutes apodictically true rules of justice must be arrived at via the means of argumentation.

2. The act of argumentation presupposes that arguers have access to scarce resources. This has implications first of all for self-ownership: “. . . no one could possibly propose anything, and no one could become convinced of any proposition by argumentative means, if a person’s right to make exclusive use of his physical body were not already presupposed.”

3. Argumentation also implies the right to claim unused scarce resources via first use (homesteading), since lack of the latter would make argumentation impossible. “By virtue of the fact of being alive, property rights to other things must be presupposed to be valid. No one who is alive could argue otherwise.”

4. “. . . [I]f a person did not acquire the right of exclusive control over . . . goods by homesteading, by establishing some objective link between a particular person and a particular resource before anyone else had done so, but instead late-comers were assumed to have ownership claims to things, then literally no one would be allowed to do anything with anything unless he had the prior consent of all late-comers.”

The above are sometimes referred to as the presuppositions of argumentation (PoA).

Criticisms of Hoppe’s AE Related to the Topic of Universalizability

1. Osterfeld

“[T]here is the possibility of intermediate communities. Isn’t it possible for members of community A to agree on their own set of rules regarding property, for members of community B to establish their own set of rules, etc.? And then isn’t it possible for representatives of communities A, B . . . N to agree, bilaterally or collectively, on the principles governing interactions between their communities?”(7)

It certainly is possible for different communities to have different rules of justice, and that is the actual state of the world we live in. However, Hoppe’s AE shows that particularistic rules are not logically justifiable and are therefore arbitrary.

2. Ethan Waters

“The task of those seeking to establish the libertarian ethic is not simply to show that people possess rights that must be respected at some times and in some ways, but to show that the rights must be respected universally, in all contexts and in all ways. Hoppe fails at this task, as others have failed before him.”(8)

Hoppe answered this objection in an expanded version of his argument as follows:

“. . . as argumentation implies that everyone must in principle be able to be convinced of it simply because of its argumentative force [correctness], the universalization principle of ethics can now be understood and explained as grounded in the wider ’a priori of communication and argumentation.’”(9)

3. Murphy and Callahan

"To simply declare that ownership rights must be ’universalizable’ is no help, either; after all, communists could cite the same principle to ’prove’ that everyone should have equal shares to all property."(10)

This criticism ignored #4 above in the PoA. Also, Kinsella responded as follows;

“[Callahan and Murphy] write here as if they are totally unaware that Hoppe has explicitly stated that ’the universalization principle only provides a purely formal criterion for morality’ . . . Of course, even if socialism’s principles were reformulated in a completely universalizable way, it will still be inconsistent with other norms presupposed in argumentation. . . ”(11)

MC:

“. . . Hoppe has only proven self-ownership for the individuals in the debate. This is because, even on Hoppe’s own grounds, someone denying the libertarian ethic would only be engaging in contradiction if he tried to justify his preferred doctrine to its ’victims.’ For example, so long as Aristotle only argued with other Greeks about the inferiority of barbarians and their natural status as slaves, then he would not be engaging in a performative contradiction. . . . It is tempting to respond to the above example by saying, ’That’s silly. If Aristotle tried to justify his views to a barbarian debating opponent, he would necessarily be engaging in contradiction. Therefore, his views are . . . unjustifiable.’ [I]f we accept [this response], then we must also admit that human ’domination’ of ’lower’ animals is also unjustifiable.”(12)

To which Walter Block replied:

“The argument from argument only applies to people who argue, and chickens, horses, babies and comatose people simply are not in it. As for non-Greeks (barbarians) they are certainly capable of arguing. If they do, they would commit a performative contradiction if they initiated violence against a Greek."(13)

4. Timothy Terrell:

“[D]efense of the self-ownership axiom relies upon the rule of ethics that an ethical system must apply equally to all people. If this rule did not hold true, a special entity or class of entities could own one or more people. No reason why this rule of ethics must hold true is presented—it is accepted on faith and is therefore subject to the criticism above. It is no defense to place the burden of proving the existence of owned people on the opposition, for neither Hoppe nor Rothbard present any compelling reason to believe that this universality rule should hold over any other ethical rule. No justification is offered other than the ’self-evident’ nature of these principles. To argue the universality rule based on a ’most people agree that. . . ’ argument seems to ignore grave epistemological difficulties.”(14)

By this time, Hoppe had long ago expounded the proposition that arguing implies universal acceptance of the results of argumentation,(15) but see also below.

Conclusion

Hoppe’s critics in general preferred to attack AE on grounds other than lack of universalizability. I suspect the reason to be that many of them may have understood that the argument based on argumentation has built-in universalizability:

Major premise: Logically justifiable rules of justice must be presented via an argument (self-evidently true).

Minor premise: No one can argue logically against the presuppositions of argumentation (true, because attempting to do so would result in a performative contradiction).

Conclusion: Rules of justice not based on the presuppositions of argumentation can’t be logically justified (follows apodictically).

As an apodictic conclusion must be universally applicable, and only rules of justice based on the PoA can be logically justified, one can say that they are “universalizable,” i.e., must apply to everyone that argues.(16)

Furthermore, since no explicit reference to universalizability is necessary in the AE argument, one might also say that AE makes the topic of universalizability (at least, within the realm of justice theory) obsolete.

Notes

1. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, 402. A resemblance to the Christian Golden Rule, “And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise” (Luke 6:31), is frequently noted.

2. Kant’s Categorical Imperative makes a pretty good Hypothetical Imperative (a social rule that is attractive because of the ends that it seeks to attain, i.e. consequentialism), but Hypothetical Imperatives are not apodictic.

3.Hume's Law (explained elsewhere) states that such an attempt must be unsuccessful.

4. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, 42. This claim seems to owe something to Hare, The Language of Morals, 162.

5. A term coined by Hare (Freedom and Reason, 18), meaning the opposite of universalizable.

6. First appeared in “The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic,” Liberty (September, 1988), but was subsequently elaborated.

7. Austrian Economics Newsletter, Vol. 9, No. 3, 9–10.

8. “Beyond Is and Nought,” Liberty, Vol. 2, No. 2, 47.

9. Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, 131.

10. “Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethic: A Critique,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 53–64.

11. Kinsella was referring to what Hoppe had written in A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 157ff in which he expanded on the topic of the relation of the criterion of universalizability to other ethical requirements (“. . . the universalization principle only provides a purely formal criterion for morality.”).

12. Hoppe, ibid.

13. “Rejoinder to Murphy and Callahan on Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 22, 631–9.

14. “The Origin of Property Rights: A Critique of Rothbard and Hoppe on Natural Rights,” (2000).

15. Hoppe, op.cit, 131.

16. The topic of universalizability arises from a desire to circumvent Hume’s Law which will be dealt with elsewhere.

References

[1] Block, Walter, “Rejoinder to Murphy and Callahan on Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 22.

[2] Callahan, Gene and Murphy, Robert, “Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethic: A Critique,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2.:

[3] Hare, R.M., The Language of Morals, Oxford University Press, 1952.

[4] _________, Freedom and Reason, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963.

[5] Hoppe, Hans-Hermann, “The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic,” Liberty (September, 1988)

[6] _________________, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, Kluwer, Boston, 1988.

[7] Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, London: Longman, Green & Co., 1895.

[8] Osterfeld, David, Austrian Economics Newsletter, Vol. 9, No. 3.

[9] Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, New York University Press, 2002.

[10] Terrell, Timothy, “The Origin of Property Rights: A Critique of Rothbard and Hoppe on Natural Rights,” (2000).

[11] Waters, Ethan, “Beyond Is and Nought,” Liberty, Vol. 2, No. 2.

A Few Considerations from Justice Theory Applied to Mandatory Vaccination

     Top-down mandatory vaccination is currently believed by some to be justified in that it allegedly prevents harm due to transmission of infectious disease. It is claimed that people have a right not to be infected with a disease and that this right trumps other persons' rights to self-ownership and other property rights. A consistent theory of property rights should resolve conflicting property rights claims, for that is the very justification for property rights, justice, and legal systems in general. Can top-down mandatory vaccination trump all other property rights? As far as I know, the case has not been made, only the claim asserted, so I won't try to create what might turn out to be a strawman argument. Instead, I'll just consider how tort law concepts might be applied to the topic of disease transmission, as I believe the traditional tort law is closest to a just legal system. 

     1. The first legal category of infectious disease transmission is the case where one person unknowingly infects another. Such a case should not be considered tortious because of the long-standing legal doctrine that a person is not responsible for acts of nature. Example: a hurricane blows a tree off of your property which goes through your neighbor's window. You are not responsible, and the damage to your neighbor's property is attributed to the hurricane.

2. The second legal category is when one person knowingly attempts to infect and succeeds in infecting another person resulting in objective damages. This case should be considered tortious. In the tree-through-the-neighbor's window scenario, this would be equivalent to attaching the tree to a crane and swinging it over into the neighbor's window.

3. The third legal category is negligence. The formula can be complicated, but basically, the concept of negligence holds that if an injury is cause by the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a person's actions (or inaction), then that person may be guilty of "negligence." From a justice point of view, there is a problem with this category in that "reasonably foreseeable" is not an objectively-definable term. Cultural considerations may come into play when trying to apply the concept to real-life societies. Applying this to the tree-through-the-neighbor's window, it could in some societies be the case that you planted your tree too close to the boundary line between your property and your neighbor's, plus, perhaps, your neighbor's house had been built first before the tree was planted, and therefore you should have taken more care in where you planted the tree, etc. There are many possible considerations that could be taken into account.

     Of the three categories, "negligence" would seem to be the best idea for a "top-downer" to analogize to try to justify mandatory vaccination. However, in a just legal system, even admitting the category of negligence as grounds for prosecution in the case of disease transmission, the normal procedures of justice should still be followed. In other words, a specific plaintiff should sue a specific tortfeasor based on specific damages caused by the tortfeasor's "negligence."

Minimum Wage Rears Its Ugly Head Again

     A while ago, I commented on the minimum wage put into effect by the Arizona State legislature. It appears that my comment had no effect, as we still have a minimum wage here in AZ, and now they're even talking about instituting a higher one on the national level.

  Let's think about the logical implications of a minimum wage.

     When a minimum wage is instituted, the cost of labor rises. When costs rise, a business may or may not remain profitable.

     If a business is not profitable it will, sooner or later, cease business operations. In this case, the labor employed by the business will be disemployed and the capital (if any remains) will be set free to seek another line of production.

     If the business remains profitable, it may continue operations, but there is the question of the ROI. How is its ROI compared to other sectors of the economy? If it's lower, investment in the business may dry up, and the business eventually cease operations.

     On the other hand, the business owner may have various options to maintain profitability.

1. Automation. If the cost of labor goes up, the owner may find it feasible to replace (or speed up replacement of) human labor with machines. 

2. The owner may try to make his employees work harder or more efficiently with a view to using less labor. (Though why the owner wouldn't have already done that before the imposition of the minimum wage is puzzling.)

3. The business owner may try to pass on the increased cost to the customers. 

a. If the customers choose not to bear the addtional cost, the business ceases operations and labor is disemployed.

b.  If some customers choose to bear the additional cost, the business may continue operations, but employing fewer factors of production (including labor). 

c. If all customers choose to bear the additional cost, everything is ok, right? Wrong. Just because the business owner raised prices, doesn't mean the customer got a raise! The customer still has the same amount of resources (money) ante-minimum wage law enactment. If the customer chooses to maintain pre-enactment level of spending at a business that raised its prices due to the minimum wage law, that expenditure has to come out of another part of the customer's budget, and other economic sectors will be debited whatever is credited to the minimum wage-affected sector.

4. In an attempt to make an end-run around the difficult choices in #3, a business owner may engage in "shrinkflation" to try to lower costs. Instead of raising prices, the size or quality of the product is altered so that it costs less to produce.

     But the bottom line is that, after a minimum wage is enacted, the same amount of output is produced with more input; in other words, productivity decreases. This is a move in the direction of impoverishment.

     On the bright side, minimum wage labor is currently a very small sector of the labor force in the U.S., and will not likely cause great damage to the larger economy. Plus, as money loses its purchasing power due to inflation, the minimum wage sinks to the natural market level.

     The above analysis assumes ceteris paribus---"all other things being equal." Of course, in the real world, all other things are never equal. Such factors as rising inflation or changing demand can mitigate, offset, or mask the cost-raising effects of the minimum wage, but the fact remains that aggregate wealth would have been greater without it.

2020 Election---How I Voted and Why

     First of all, I voted Libertarian Party. That is because, after reading the party platforms of the four largest parties (Democratic, Republican, Green, and Libertarian), I find that the Libertarian Party platform moves us in the direction of justice and prosperity significantly more than the other platforms. However, at least in 2020, Libertarian Party candidates are not available for many positions.

     Secondly, I voted for some select Republicans. This in spite of the fact that, although there may be language in the Republican platform that resembles some language in the Libertarian platform, once elected, Republicans in general tend to be under-performers with regards to promoting justice and prosperity. The exception is the Republican Liberty Caucus. RLC candidates can be trusted to vote in the direction of justice and prosperity on a wide range of issues. For this reason, I consulted the Arizona Republican Liberty Caucus Liberty Index 2020 ranking for candidates that I could vote for. I voted for candidates that got a score of 90% or higher on the Liberty Index. I won't explain here the workings of the Liberty Index or why I think it's such a useful tool. Please follow the link above and decide for yourself. I think I can prove that the Liberty Index does indeed promote justice and prosperity, but that is off the topic of this post.

     I also voted for a non-Libertarian if I judged that one candidate was a significantly greater threat to justice and prosperity than the other.

". . . without his consent having even been asked a man finds himself environed by a government that he cannot resist; a government that forces him to pay money, render service, and forego the exercise of many of his natural rights, under peril of weighty punishments. He sees, too, that other men practice this tyranny over him by the use of the ballot. He sees further, that, if he will but use the ballot himself, he has some chance of relieving himself from this tyranny of others, by subjecting them to his own. In short, he finds himself, without his consent, so situated that, if he use the ballot, he may become a master; if he does not use it, he must become a slave. And he has no other alternative than these two. In self-defence, he attempts the former. His case is analogous to that of a man who has been forced into battle, where he must either kill others, or be killed himself. Because, to save his own life in battle, a man takes the lives of his opponents, it is not to be inferred that the battle is one of his own choosing. Neither in contests with the ballot---which is a mere substitute for a bullet---because, as his only chance of self-preservation, a man uses a ballot, is it to be inferred that the contest is one into which he voluntarily entered; that he voluntarily set up all his own natural rights, as a stake against those of others, to be lost or won by the mere power of numbers. On the contrary, it is to be considered that, in an exigency into which he had been forced by others, and in which no other means of self-defence offered, he, as a matter of necessity, used the only one that was left to him." ~Lysander Spooner, "On Voting," No Treason No.VI: The Constitution of No Authority, 1870

I call the above the "Lysander Spooner Proviso." However, it can't be applied if both duopoly candidates are equally undesirable.

     There were many positions that couldn't be informed by the above criteria. I've conducted random internet searches for further information, but in some cases, where the information available does not help to decide which candidate is more likely to promote justice and prosperity, I decided not to vote one way or the other ("Abstain").

President and Vice-President---Jo Jorgensen and Spike Cohen

Libertarian Party candidates

U.S. Senator---Martha McSally

Though generally not liked by Libertarians for good reason, the alternative (Mark Kelly) seems even worse, so I invoke the Lysander Spooner Proviso.

U.S. Representative---Abstain

Although Tom O'Halleran (D) ignores his constituents (and me in particular), I was equally disenchanted with Tiffany Shedd (R)'s bordertarian pro-War on Drugs stance, so I abstained.

State Senator, LD11---Abstain

The incumbent, Vince Leach (R), only got a 75 in the Liberty Index, and the challenger is a Democrat, so I abstained.

State Representatives, LD11---Bret Roberts and Mark Finchem

Bret Roberts got a 100 on the Liberty Index and Mark Finchem got a 90. Nice going!

Corporation Commissioners---Abstain

The reason I don't vote for corporation commissioners is that I don't see the Arizona Corporation Commission as something that promotes justice and prosperity. In fact, I'd like to see it abolished. Perhaps there is a way that a corporation commissioner could move us in the direction of justice and prosperity, but I've not been able to see it. Suggestions welcome!

County Supervisor, District 4---Abstain

The Pinal County Libertarian Party website offers no advice on which supervisorial candidates to vote for. Most of them are running unopposed anyway. I've not been able to figure out how to construct a scorecard for county supervisors.

County Assessor---Abstain

Douglas Wolfe running unopposed

County Attorney---Abstain

Kent Volkmer, unopposed. Due to state law, the more people that vote for the county attorney, the harder it will be for third parties to get county-level recognition.

County Recorder---Abstain

Virginia Ross, unopposed.

County School Superintendent---Abstain

Jill Broussard, unopposed.

County Sheriff---Mark Lamb

Mark Lamb is unopposed and bad on the War on Drugs and immigration, but I voted for him as symbolic support for his stance on the hysteria-induced COVID-19 proclamations of Gov. Ducey.

County Treasurer---Abstain

Michael McCord, unopposed.

Shall the Following Justices be Retained?

Robert Brutinel, Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court. Abstain. Couldn't find any info to help me make a decision.

Andrew Gould, Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court. Yes. Described in the iVoterGuide as a "proven originalist."

John Lopez IV, Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court. Yes. Described in the iVoterGuide as a "proven originalist."

Karl Eppich, Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division II. Abstain. Couldn't find any info.

Garye Vasquez, Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division II. No. The only info relevant to his judicial stance was that in 2008, he wrote a decision in a case concerning provision of state funds to private schools in which he stated:

"Only by ignoring the plain text of the Arizona Constitution prohibiting state aid to private schools could we find the aid represented by the payment of tuition fees to such schools in this case constitutional."

The legislation provided $2.5 million in state tax vouchers to the parents of former foster children who have been adopted, and $2.5 million for disabled children. I think that 1) a voucher system would move us at least a little bit in the direction of justice and prosperity, and 2) the "state aid" that was being withheld was originally money stolen from taxpayers. Granted that Vasquez's decision was correct according to the letter of the law, it was dubious from a justice pov, so I don't want to retain him.

Patrick Gard, Judge of the Superior Court, Div. 31. Abstain. Couldn't find any info.

Joseph R. Georgini, Judge of the Superior Court, Div. 20. Abstain. Couldn't find any info.

Jason R. Holmberg, Judge of the Superior Court, Div. 25. Abstain. Couldn't find any info.

Stephen F. McCarville , Judge of the Superior Court, Div. 17. Abstain. Couldn't find any info.

Christopher J. O'Neill, Judge of the Superior Court, Div. 29. Abstain. Couldn't find any info.

Robert Olson, Judge of the Superior Court, Div. 30. Abstain. Couldn't find any info.

Kelly Harrington, Chuck Wright, School Board Members. Abstain. Couldn't find any info.

Proposition 207 (partial liberalization of marijuana laws). Yes. According to the U.S. Libertarian Party platform, ". . . we favor the repeal of all laws creating 'crimes' without victims, such as . . . the use of drugs for medicinal or recreational purposes . . . "

Proposition 208 (tax the rich for education). No. According to the U.S. Libertarian Party platform, ". . . We support any initiative to reduce or abolish any tax, and oppose any increase on any tax for any reason."

Proposition 451 (issuing of bonds by Toltec Elementary School District). No. Same reason as Proposition 208, plus I'm not a fan of public education in particular.

Why Shouldn't Low-Risk People Get the Virus?

     In news dated June 24, 2020:

"The state's top health official says the key to slowing the spread of COVID-19 could be finding a way to reach the people who believe they're the least likely to get infected of suffer ill effects.
     Dr. Cara Christ said the biggest group of positive  test results is now among those age 20 through 44.
     'They're likely not the ones who are going to have the outcomes and the risk factors from COVID-19,' she told Capitol News Services.
     'But we need everybody to keep in mind that all of us have connections to loved ones and family members that all of us have connections to loved ones and family members that are high risk or people out in the community,' Christ said. 'And that's what we're trying to protect by containing the spread.'
     The trick now, she said, is crafting a message that is designed with that audience in mind.
     "We do want to see these numbers go down and we want to see the percent positivity go down,' Christ said.
     That, however, means convincing individuals to act safely---including those who may believe that even if they don't think they're invincible that contracting the virus won't really hurt them. And that, Christ said, comes back to the messages of physically distancing and wearing a mask while out in public when staying six feet from others is impossible.
     That message, however, is not getting across to those in the 20-to-44-year old demographic, she said, as evidenced by the high number of people in that age group who are testing positive for the virus---and as shown by videos of people crowding bars without masks.
     These are the people who are less likely to suffer severe adverse effects. But they're clearly coming down with---and probably transmitting---the disease.
     Consider: Of more than 43,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 so far, more than 46 percent fall into that age group.
     But they make up less than a third of the population.
     Yet, they're not dying at the same rate of the disease, accounting for just 67 of the more than 1,300 deaths.
     Christ said exhortations for these people to protect themselves apparently does not work. So that, she said, requires a change in the message.
     'We need everybody to keep in mind that all of us have connections to loved ones and family members that are high risk, or people out in the community,' she said.
     'We need everyone to think about, "You may not feel sick, you may not think that you've been infected,"' Christ said. And a lot of people appear symptomatic.
     'So it's really important that if you are going to be within six feet of somebody you have got to wear that mask,' she said.

Let's examine the assumptions behind Dr. Christ's statements.   

Can wearing masks and physical distancing have any effect on the spread of the virus?
Theoretically, wearing masks and physical distancing could slow down the virus if implemented at a certain stage of the spread of the virus. However, there is no way of knowing exactly what stage one is at during the spread of the virus---such a determination can only be made ex post. Therefore, it can't be stated with certainty that wearing masks and social distancing have any effect on the spread of the virus.

Slowing down the spread of COVID-19 is a desirable thing. 
There are only two reasons commonly given for wanting to slow the spread of the virus:
1) To avoid overwhelming medical facilities. When it's said that medical facilities, the capacity of which has been determined by the state department of health of which Dr. Christ is the head, could be overwhelmed, they are talking about indoor ICU beds. There is nothing wrong with treating patients in field hospitals which, being outside, would lessen the danger of the spread of the virus.
2) To give researchers time to develop a vaccine. Unfortunately, vaccines against respiratory diseases have not historically been all that effective. They also require a long time to develop. Meanwhile, COVID viruses mutate rapidly which limits a vaccine's period of usefulness.
     Note that the claim is not made that slowing down the spread of COVID-19 will result in fewer deaths. If there is no vaccine, anyone who hasn't already contracted the disease will be a target for the virus. The only thing that could possibly protect uninfected people in the long run would be herd immunity. But slowing down the spread of the virus retards the formation of herd immunity.

Getting everyone to wear masks and physically distance will protect high-risk people.
It would if it could be implemented at exactly the right time (which can't be known), and if everyone went along with it. However, wouldn't it be more effective to concentrate on protecting the high-risk people instead of wasting resources on implementing measures that include low-risk people?

I've yet to hear a persuasive argument that there are any benefits from measures that keep low-risk people from getting the virus.

The Ten Demands

     I don't know about you, but being an oldster, I tend to look on the rioting antifa youth with a bit of a jaundiced eye. However, in addition to being a person of a certain age, I'm also a propertarian, so my take on political philosophy is not quite in synch with that of the Democrats and Republicans of my demographic. Nevertheless, it was with a certain amount of skepticism that, when I first came across a reference to the "Ten Demands," I clicked through.

     Demand #1: "Defund the police and reallocate resources to impacted communities"

     If defunding the police means letting the taxpayers spend their taxes as they wish, then I'd be all for "defunding." There are probably some things that the police do that some people would be willing to pay for, but this could be done in a market for police services.

     However, if defunding the police entails continued violent appropriation of resources (taxation) to be re-distributed to various minoritarian interest groups, I'd be against that, so based on the wording of the Demand and subject to the proviso that it could be re-written in a more just form, I'd say disagree.

     Demand #2: "Demilitarize the police"

     Agree. This demand speaks to a troubling trend in the government monopoly police forces. "Militarization" seems to be connected with crowd control and other functions of an oppressive state. If we are to have government police, let the police forces be small and weak!

     Demand #3: "Eliminate discriminatory policing, prosecution, and sentencing"

     Agree, but the problem with this demand is that, even if you could wave a magic wand, and the criminal justice system were somehow reformed in a way that it could be determined that Afro-Americans were treated the same as all other ethnic groups, the system itself still has built-in injustice.       Criminal justice is based on the premise that a "criminal" can be prosecuted for violating the criminal law because the infraction constitutes a violation of the "rights" of the state or the "people" collectively. I won't go into why I think this theory is wrong, but just note that we have a model for a just legal system in tort law. In tort law, there must be a specific victim and a specific perpetrator (tortfeasor), and the victim must be able to show that he or she suffered tangible damages at the hands of the tortfeasor. Most criminal laws would not pass such a high bar.

     Demand #4: "Institute complete law enforcement transparency and accountability"

     Agree, but as the demand is somewhat vague, I wonder how it would be met.

     I'll guess that it is founded in the belief that a public entity, funded by public resources as it is, should be controlled or managed by the public. The problem is, who is the public? In a democracy, that can mean that control shifts when a new interest group wins an election. It could theoretically mean that if 51% of the voters didn't want "transparency and accountability," a demand to the contrary would be un-democratic.

     Contrast the confusion about who can do what with public security with the idea of private (propertarian) security. A propertarian security market would evolve in response to consumer demand. The functions of the police might indeed be divided among various specialists, i.e., parking enforcers, social workers, bail bondsmen, security guards, bounty hunters, neighborhood watch, detective agencies, insurance investigators, etc. There might only be a small number of armed responders to violent violations of property rights, perhaps backed up by trained voluntary citizens' posses.

     Demand #5: "Independently investigate all police crimes and abuses of power"

     Agree. It seems obvious that an organization whose member(s) are accused of malfeasance should not be in charge of the investigation!

     Demand #6: "Install community representation, oversight, and safety measures"

     Disagree. The institution of these measures in the existing criminal justice system would only lead to more bureaucratization and likely to regulatory capture in an already unresponsive and irresponsible system.

     Meanwhile, a propertarian legal system's adherence to legal norms is promoted by 1) continued voluntary patronization of for-profit entities by satisfied customers, and 2) citizen participation in non-profit voluntary organizations that perform certain functions in the legal system.

     Demand #7: "End strategic counter-protest violence"

     How do people in a propertarian society protest? If there were no "public property," protesters could nevertheless gather on any property whose owner(s) agreed to the protest event. "Counter-protesters" could only appear by consent of these owners, but a contract could be made between protesters and property owners that no counter-protesters would be allowed at the protest event.

     Meanwhile, who may or may not protest on "public property" is a complex question decided by politicians who carefully weigh their decisions' effects on their re-election chances.

     Demand #8: "Apologize and provide reparations"

     Disagree, with the caveat that I might agree if the wording were more specific.

     As for apologizing, it seems meaningless unless a specific rights-violator apologizes to his or her victim. A blanket "white-to-black" apology, if that's what's being demanded, would be a fallacy of collective thinking. One is supposed to be responsible for one's own actions, not the actions of other people.

     The same principle applies to reparations for slavery. In the case of the enslavement of a certain person A by person B, person A should have a claim against person B. However, persons C, D, E, etc. have no grounds for a claim against B merely on the basis of ethnic affiliation with A.

    Along these lines, Walter Block has made a seemingly valid propertarian argument for reparations, provided that just legal principles are followed. According to Block, reparations can be just if specific descendants of a victim of slavery can demonstrate a certain relationship to a certain slave-owner's property.

     I would have to agree with a proposal for reparations if it were worded in conformity with Block's argument.

     Demand #9: "End the War on Drugs"

     Agree. As a propertarian, I think it a true statement that human beings are self-owners. If one is a self-owner, then one has the right to take drugs. Furthermore, drug sellers have the right to sell drugs to drug buyers. The War on Drugs is therefore, in its most simplest terms, unjust.

     Demand #10: "End carceral punishment"

     Agree. In a propertarian society, there would be no taxes, and therefore no resources for incarcerating large numbers of people. Perhaps there would be jails where tortfeasors would be temporarily incarcerated during their trials, but long term incarceration---who would pay for that? And can incarceration be justified? I think not.

     Sentencing should be based on one of two basic principles: retribution or restitution. In the latter case, a tortfeasor could be justly enslaved to the extent necessary (and limited by proportionality) to pay back the victim for the tangible damages inflicted. While enslavement might (but might not) include living in a secure facility, the expenses should be paid out of the tortfeasor's resources, and not by a taxpayer who had no relationship to the tort.

                                                                              ***

    To my surprise, I agreed outright with six of the Demands, disagreed with three, and could not decide on one because it raised the question of who is entitled to control public property, which I claim is not resolvable by logical analysis and therefore no conclusion can be justified.

     In all cases, justice could be enhanced to a greater or lesser degree by moving the legal system in a propertarian direction.

People Are Not Property (?)

     Recently, protesters in the U.S. have justified the destruction of property on the grounds that such activity has no moral implications. Property can always be replaced; people can't. There are moral (justice) rules that should be applied to people, but these same rules should not be applied to property.

     The legal category "property" is based on the concept of ownership. Ownership can be attributed to any human action that implies control over a rivalrous entity. A human body is certainly a rivalrous entity, meaning that only one person can exert control over a human body (or any of its aspects that are conceptualizable as discrete constituents of the bundle of property rights) at a time. Therefore, human bodies may be analyzed according to the same principles as scarce physical objects or other rivalrous entities.

     Is ownership a moral category? According to Hans-Hermann Hoppe's deduction based in the ethics of argumentation, it would be illogical to argue that A. human beings are not self-owners, and B. that human beings have no right to own property.

     According to my own argument (in the process of being constructed), a person who wanted to argue that human beings are not self-owners and should not have a right to own property would have to affirm two statements: 1. it is desirable that there be conflict over rivalrous resources, and 2. it is desirable that rules of justice be particularistic (i.e., different rules for different people). If one were not willing to approve of these claims, one would have to accede to the claim that justice should be based on self-ownership and property and with the understanding that self-ownership is subsumed under property ownership in general. (I will refrain from reproducing the entire argument at this point in the interests of focusing attention on the topic of this essay. Feel free to comment in the comments section.)

     So, to deny the moral standing of property ownership is to affirm a preference for conflict over scarce (or rivalrous) resources and a preference also for different rules for different people. Against this, the proponents of the dichotomy between human bodies and other forms of property have only proposed a subjective preference that human bodies not be considered property.

     Now, there is an important point that should be clarified: what is meant by moral? My arguments apply to that segment of traditional moral philosophy known as "justice theory." In other words, my arguments are based on the supposition that there is a need for rules for interactions between human beings that are related to the question of "Who should be allowed to do what with what rivalrous entities?"

     It is possible to use the word "moral" as it was traditionally used in a religious sense: that is to say, rules that were arbitrarily determined by religious authorities and philosophers of religion. These rules could guide not only human interactions, but also how a human should act even if the question of conflict over rivalrous entities was not relevant to an action. Although the tradition of forming these rules based on religious precepts may be waning, their logical character has not changed in that they are still arbitrary and their basic assumptions are nothing but subjective preferences.

    Thankfully, philosophy has advanced beyond the need to pay homage to unverifiable and arbitrary assumptions, and we can demonstrate that the "moral" precept that "people are not property" (short for "social rules should apply to people more than property") is unjust.

     Finally, I'd like to clarify that "people are more important than property" may be a sound statement in one area of justice theory: namely, the study of sentencing (retribution and restitution). It is generally agreed among propertarians that the property one has in a human body is the most important property that a human being can possess, this for obvious reasons. Therefore, in the limited field of sentencing, the statement that human beings (human bodies) are more important than (other forms of) property is a correct and valuable precept.